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Dugan: Are you crying?
Player: No.
Dugan: Are you crying?
Player: (Shakes head)
Dugan: Are you crying? There's no crying in baseball. There's no
crying in baseball. Roger Hornsby was my manager and he
called me a talking pile of pig shit. And that was when my
parents drove all the way down from Michigan to see me play
the game. And did I cry?
Player: No?
Dugan: No. No. And do you know why?
Player: No.
Dugan: Because there's no crying in baseball. There's no crying in
baseball. No crying.
Umpire: What's the matter, Jimmy?
Dugan: She's crying, sir?
Umpire: Perhaps you chastised her too vehemently. Good rule of
thumb. Treat each of these girls as you would treat your
mother.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The film, A League of Their Own, is based on the All-American Girls
Professional Baseball League. Chicago Cubs' owner, Philip K. Wrigley,
and other major league baseball club owners started the league in 1943 to
replace men's major league baseball, which had been put on hold during the
World War I1 years.3 Meant as a temporary substitute, the league survived
the end of the war and lasted until 1954.4
Women's participation in the league, which in some ways paralleled
women's participation in the workforce during the war years in previously
male-dominated industries, raised questions about proper gender roles.5 One
concern was that women's participation in sports (or in certain jobs) would
have the negative effect of masculinizing women. While one response to this
concern might have been to exclude women from sports or from certain jobs,
the exigencies of the war and the profit motives of the baseball club owners
1. A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN (Columbia Pictures 1992).
2. Id.
3. For a history of the All-American Girls Baseball League, see SUSAN K. CAHN, COMING
ON STRONG: GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY WOMEN'S SPORT 140-63 (1994);
NIKE IS A GODDESS: THE HISTORY OF WOMEN IN SPORTS 46-49 (Lissa Smith ed., 1988).
4. CAHN, supra note 3, at 147.
5. Id. at3.
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precluded this response.6 Given the participation of women in previously
male-dominated sectors, the concerns shifted to how the women were to
behave, and how they were to be treated. Was their similarity to men to be
emphasized? Or their difference?7
These questions are encapsulated in A League of Their Own.' In the
film, Tom Hanks plays Jimmy Dugan, an alcoholic former baseball star who
manages one of the new women's teams, the Rockford Peaches. 9 In the early
games of the season, a barely lucid Dugan pays scant attention to his team.
They are not worth his attention because he does not consider them to be
legitimate professional athletes. As the Peaches begin to win, Dugan begins
to regard them as athletes and takes more of an interest in their success.' 0 In
the above excerpt, Dugan scolds one of the players, the right fielder, for an
error that costs the team the lead. The player is reduced to tears.
11
Dugan justifies the scolding by pointing out that that was the way he
was treated when he was a professional player, and says that if the player
wants to be considered a "ballplayer" she must learn to "take it like a
man."12 Dugan's diatribe demonstrates the view that to be taken seriously as
an athlete, women must replicate the behaviors prevalent in male-dominated
sports. Acceptance of this model leaves no room for women to complain of
conditions that are unique to them or disparately affect them because they
are women and also athletes. 13 The insistence on sameness might provide
opportunities for women, but it comes at a cost. The umpire's response that
emphasizes difference, for example, while providing for kinder treatment,
6. Id. at 148-163.
7. The question of sameness and difference animates much of feminist theory. See
Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race, in "RACE,"
WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21, 25 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1985) (describing "on the one hand,
a simple claim to equality, a denial of substantial difference; on the other, a claim to a special
message, revaluing the feminine Other not as the helpmeet of sexism, but as the New Woman"). See
also Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 798 (1989) ("I start out, as
have many others, from the deep split among American feminists between "sameness" and
"difference.").
8. A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. While the encounter between Dugan and the right fielder is fictional, the
professional women's baseball league featured in the film is based on the true experiences of the
league that existed between 1943 and 1954. 1d; CAHN, supra note 3, at 140-163.
12. A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN, supra note 1.
13. Kimberle Crenshaw observes that while African-American women experience
discrimination both because of their gender and because of their race, anti-discrimination laws treat
characteristics such as race and gender as separate and distinct. Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140. She argues that
this single-issue approach leads to further marginalization of those caught at this intersection of race
and gender. Id.
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can result in foreclosing opportunities. After all, there are some things that
you might not want to let your mother do. Different notions of proper gender
roles animate the "sameness" vs. "difference" debate.' 4
Although the All-American Girls Professional Baseball League
provided an opportunity to explore the intersection of gender and sports, its
early demise in 1954 led to this discussion being put on hold. Today, with
the ever-increasing participation of girls and women in sports, it is time to
revisit that conversation. While A League of Their Own involved
professional sports, this Article focuses on sports in the educational context
as an important opportunity for legal intervention because of the stronger
role that the law plays in this environment. Because the law involves the
allocation of resources and the policing of behavior by the government, this
discussion prompts us to ask how resources should be allocated and what
kinds of behavior should be encouraged and discouraged in promoting
gender equity. In particular, the analysis of sports within educational
programs offers an opportunity for a critical examination of current models
of athletic participation that foster an environment in which harassment
often occurs.
In Part II, I examine the role that Title IX has had in increasing the
participation of girls and women in sports. This increase has brought
attention to the treatment of athletes, both men and women. High-profile
accounts of verbal and physical abuse of athletes by coaches and by other
athletes have led to a re-examination of coach/athlete and athlete/athlete
relations. I examine some of these accounts. In Part III, I focus on sexual
harassment as the primary area where law, through Title IX, places
constraints on behavior. I focus on harassment as an important situation
which causes law and sports to intersect. Law, by defining the negative,
helps to shape what can take place in the positive sphere by defining
allowable behavior and treatment of athletes. Thus, looking at what is
impermissible allows an exploration of what coaches and athletes ought to
do to transform our present notion of what constitutes an athlete and how
proper gender roles should be defined. In Part IV, I sketch the preliminary
contours of how we might manage the sameness/difference debate by
imagining new models for athletic behavior.
II. TITLE IX AND PARTICIPATION IN ATHLETICS
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197215 sets forth a seemingly
straightforward mandate: "no person... shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from, denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimination under any
program" conducted by an educational institution that is the recipient of
14. These gendered models of athletic participation are discussed in Part IV of this Article.
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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federal financial assistance. 16 Title IX not only changed the educational
landscape for female students, it also changed the landscape for female
athletes because the "programs" covered by the statute applied to athletic
programs as well as to admissions and scholarship programs.17 After the
passage of Title IX, educational institutions were required to equalize
athletic opportunities and programs for men and women or risk losing
federal funding.
18
The passage and enforcement of Title IX has provided women with
unprecedented opportunities to participate in organized sports at all levels-
elementary, 19 high school,20 and college. 21 Although Title IX only applies to
educational institutions, the increase in participation at the high school and
college level has created a pool of talent that has gone on to participate in
contests like the Olympic games22 and professional sports. 23 The gold-
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. With respect to athletics, Title IX covers three major areas: financial assistance,
accommodation of student interests and abilities, and other athletic benefits and opportunities.
Athletic benefits and opportunities include: equipment and supplies, scheduling of games and
practice times, travel and per diem allowances, coaching, locker rooms and other facilities, medical
and training facilities and services, housing and dining facilities and services, and publicity.
Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities Prohibited, 34 C.F.R. §
106.41 (2000). While each team need not get exactly the same services, overall men's programs and
women's programs must receive the same level of services, facilities and supplies. KATHRYN M.
REITH, PLAYING FAIR: A WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION GUIDE TO TITLE IX IN HIGH SCHOOL &
COLLEGE SPORTS 19 (1999), available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.orgbinary-
data/WSF_ARTICLE/ pdLfilel 195.pdf.
19. Participation of girls ages 6-I1 in fifteen vigorous sports increased from 2 million in
1987 to 3.8 million in 1998. WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION, Women's Sports Facts, in TITLE IX:
AN EDUCATION RESOURCE (1999).
20. In 1971, prior to the passage of Title IX, less than 300,000 girls participated in high
school sports nationwide, compared to over 3.6 million male participants in the same year. But,
twenty-seven years after the passage of Title IX, female participation at the high school level has
growa nine-fold. By 1998, approximately 2.7 miliion girls and over 3.7 million boys played high
school sports. WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION, WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION POSITION ON
CURRENT TITLE IX ISSUES 1 www.womensportsfoundation.org/templates/rescenter/rclib/results_
topics.html?record=28 (last visited Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with author).
21. The number of women participating at the college level has doubled since the passage
of Title IX. The number of women athletes participating in sports increased from fewer than 50,000
participants in 1971 to over 100,000 in 1997. Male athlete participation increased from over 150,000
in 1971 to approximately 200,000 in 1997. WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION, PARTICIPATION
STATISTICS PACKET (May, 1999) (including annual statistical reports from 1971 to 1997). While
men's participation rates increased, the percentage increase for men was less than for women
athletes. Id.
22. The number of women participating in the Olympics has nearly tripled since the
passage of Title IX. More than 3,500 (3,684) girls and women participated in the 1996 Olympics as
compared to 1,058 women in the 1972 Olympics. Women made up thirty-four percent of all
Olympic participants in 1996. WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION, supra note 21, at 12.
23. Riding the wave of Olympic success from the Atlanta Games, two women's
professional basketball leagues were launched-the American Basketball League in 1996 and the
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medal-winning women's basketball team in the 2000 Summer Olympics, the
hockey team in the 1998 Winter Olympics, and the soccer team in the 1999
World Cup are examples of the spectacular successes of women who came
of age in the Title IX era. Even so, increased participation in sports by
women is only a partial success.
While Title IX has been successful in getting women "on the playing
field," it leaves somewhat unresolved how they should be treated once they
get there. Title Ix's proclamation of equality is misleading.24 While
mandating formal equality, such as equal training facilities and equal
funding,25 it implicitly presumes that the structure of women's sports is to be
Women's National Basketball Association in 1997. See Brad Parks, Not Just an Old Boys' Club;
Women's Pro Leagues Make Bid for the Big Time, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1996, at Al, 1996 WL
13427411. The two leagues combined created almost 200 jobs for women basketball players in the
United States. Michael Kane, What's a Woman to Do? Death of One League Again Means Dearth of
Pro Options in U.S., DENY. POST, Dec. 27, 1998, at Cl, 1998 WL 18535265. This number fell
dramatically, however, in 1999, after the American Basketball League folded. Id. A women's
professional softball league began play in 1997. See Kelley King, A Big Hit in Little Cities: A
Women's Pro Softball League Has Found Its Niche, SPORTS ILLUS., Sept. 6, 1999, at RI, 1999 WL
22047576; Parks, supra. The Women's United Soccer Association (WUSA), a women's professional
soccer league, is scheduled to launch in spring 2001. See Peter Brewington, Women Attack Crowded
Field: Games to Begin in Spring 2001 for 8-10 Teams, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 2000, at 14C,
available at LEXIS Newsfile; Mark Zeigler, In WUSA, Women's Soccer Turns Pro, SAN DIEGO
TRtB., Feb. 19, 2000, at D1, 2000 WL 13948798. A women's professional football league began
play in 2000. See Kim Homer, A Field of Football Dreams: Newly Created League for Women
Holds Tryouts at Local Park, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Aug. 13, 2000, at 43A, 2000 WL 24851450.
Plans for a women's professional ice hockey league are on hold. See David Shoalts, Women's Pro
Hockey League Remains a Dream; More Quality Players Needed to Make It Go, Members of Gold-
Medal Winning Canadian Team Say, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 16, 1999, at S 1.
24. The equality premise in Title IX does not mean that women are allowed to compete
equally with or against men in all sports. Title IX permits schools to operate separate teams for men
and women where the selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity
involved is a contact sport, such as boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football and basketball. For
contact sports, the institution need not offer a separate women's team nor allow women to try out for
the men's team. Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities Prohibited,
34 C.F.R. 106.41 (2000). The "separate but equal" philosophy adopted in Title Ix's implementing
regulations sparked a vigorous debate. On the one hand, some argue that the regulations benefit
women because if teams were integrated on a gender-neutral basis, the result would be fewer
opportunities for women overall, because men would dominate. On the other hand, some argue that
the enforced gender line hurts the "extraordinary" woman, the woman fully capable of competing
against men, and further that the contact sport exemption itself violates the Equal Protection Clause.
See generally Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a
Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381 (2000) (arguing that the contact sports exception violates
Equal Protection); Karen L. Tokarz, Separate But Unequal Educational Sports Programs: The Need
for a New Theory of Equality, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 201, 205 (1985) (asserting that sex
segregation in athletics violates Equal Protection).
25. Although women's athletic programs have gained ground in garnering a more equitable
share of funding, inequities remain. For example, at the major college level women constitute 42%
of the athletes. In 1998-99 they received about 40% of athletics-scholarship budgets, 31% of
recruiting budgets, 34% of coaching-salary budgets, and 33% of total operating expenses. See Welch
Suggs, Uneven Progress for Women's Sports: A Chronicle Survey Finds Gains at Big-Time Football
Powers, Struggles at the 'Have-Nots,' CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2000, at A52. The major
college level includes schools in Division I of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).
The NCAA is a voluntary athletic organization made up of 977 schools classified in three
divisions-Division I has 318 schools, Division I has 264, and Division Ifi has 395. NATIONAL
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26
modeled on men's sports. Superimposing a male structure encourages
women to replicate behaviors prevalent in male-dominated sports27 and fails
to account for those areas where the experiences of women athletes may
deviate from those of their male counterparts, such as vulnerability to sexual
harassment.
28
IH. TITLE IX AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 2 9 IN ATHLETICS
Sex-based harassment of students is a real and serious problem in
education at all levels.30 I use the term sex-based harassment to allow for a
discussion of both the traditional notion of sexual harassment and
harassment based on gender. In this section, I will examine sex-based
harassment in athletics, the full extent of which is unknown because of
underreporting. I will then examine Title IX and will argue that one of the
limitations of Title IX is that it borrows too heavily from Title VII
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNANCE, at http//www.ncaa.
org (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
26. This Article concentrates specifically on the implications of the adoption of the "male
model" of athletic participation in women's team sports and more specifically those sports that
qualify as contact sports under Title IX's implementing regulations. See infra Part 1V.C and 34
C.F.R. § 106.41.
27. Hazing, for example, is prevalent in male sports. Hazing is a term used to describe
various initiation rites within groups. There is no universally accepted definition of hazing. A 1999
study by Alfred University of hazing rituals on various college campuses defined hazing as "any
humiliating or dangerous activity expected of you to join a group regardless of your willingness to
participate." ALFRED UNIVERSITY, NATIONAL SURVEY: INITIATION RITES AND ATHLETICS FOR
NCAA SPORTS TEAMs 8 (1999), available at http://www.alfred.edu/news/itml/hazing-study-
99.html (ast visited Apr. 16, 2001). Females were found almost as likely as males to take part in
some form of hazing activities. Females, however, were less likely to participate in the more extreme
forms of hazing. Md
28. See Celia Brackenridge & Sandra Kirby, Playing Safe: Assessing the Risk of Sexual
Abuse to Elite Child Athletes, 32 INT'L REV. SOC. SPORT 407, 412 (1997) (stating that female
athletes "demonstratlel a higher degree of vulnerability" to harassment and abuse, a "higher
awareness" of harassment and abuse and a "wider variation in the types of abuse[] they experienced"
than males).
29. The terms "sexual abuse" and "sexual harassment" are often used interchangeably.
Sociologists suggest that sexual abuse is a more severe form of sexual harassment, that both are
"stages along the continuuum of sexual violence." See Celia Brackenridge, "He Ovned Me
Basically... ": Women's Experience of Sexual Abuse in Sport, 32 INT'L REV. SOC. SPORT 115, 116-
17 (1997) (noting that the line between harassment and abuse is unclear, but suggesting that abuse
involves groomed or coerced behavior where the abuser entices or entraps the target of the abuse to
the point where the conduct appears to be wanted, while sexual harassment, on the other hand,
involves unwanted attention).
30. According to one report, twenty to thirty percent of undergraduate female students are
the victims of some form of sexual harassment by at least one of their professors during their
undergraduate years. See; L. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment
in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAVIOR 152, 155 (1988) (citing BILLIE
WRIGHT DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON
CAMPUS (1984))(reporting that in a survey of two universities, one-half to two-thirds of
undergraduate women reported they had experienced sexual harassment under an expanded
definition of harassment which includes sexist remarks and other forms of gender harassment).
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jurisprudence and is unable to account fully for the differences between
education and employment. Further, I will pay special attention to what
qualifies as harassment. The effectiveness of Title IX is further limited by
the heavy burden that must be met before an educational institution can be
held liable.
A. The Extent of Harassment and the Problem of Underreporting
High-profile sexual harassment allegations against well-known coaches
have focused attention on the problem of sexual harassment in sports. 31
University of North Carolina soccer players and Syracuse University tennis
players, for example, accused their respective coaches of sexual
harassment.32 In Jennings v. University of North Carolina,33 a University of
North Carolina soccer player, Debbie Keller, a former U.S. national team
player and a former college player of the year, accused her North Carolina
soccer coach Anson Dorrance of inappropriate behavior, including making
uninvited sexual comments.34 Another former North Carolina player,
Melissa Jennings, accused Dorrance of creating a hostile environment for
her before cutting her from the team.35 In Ericson v. Syracuse University,36
tennis players at Syracuse University accused their male tennis coach, Jesse
Dwire, of inappropriate conduct including unwanted massages, sexist
comments and sex-related conversations. 37 Unfortunately, there are no
31. For timely discussions of sexual harassment in sports, see Joe Mathews, Compton
Coach Charged With Molesting Player; Courts: Dominguez High Mentor Russell Otis, Who Has
Strongly Denied Wrongdoing, Will Plead Not Guilty, His Lawyer Says, LA. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000,
at B1, 2000 WL 25919539 (reporting on charges of sexual abuse brought against a "nationally
prominent coach of one of Southern California's best high school basketball teams"); RESOLUTION
ON THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ABUSE OF WOMEN, YOUNG PEOPLE AND
CHILDREN IN SPORT, 9TH COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR
SPORT (2000), at http://culture.coe.frlnfocentre/txt/eng/espresOO.3.html (resolving to prepare a
national policy regarding the problem of sexual abuse in sports and to implement that policy within a
specific timetable); Danielle Deak, Comment, Out of Bounds: How Sexual Abuse of Athletes at the
Hands of Their Coaches Is Costing the World of Sports Millions, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 171
(1999) (noting that sexual abuse in sports is increasingly prevalent); John T. Wolohan, Sexual
Harassment of Student Athletes and the Law: A Review of the Rights Afforded Students, 5 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 339, 340-41 (1995) (noting that sexual harassment suits against coaches are rare,
but suggesting athletic administrators can no longer ignore the issue and articulating the basis of
sexual harassment between coaches and players).
32. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., No. 98 C 5261, 1991 WL 301669, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30,
1999); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
33. 1999 WL 301669, at *1.
34. Gary Davidson, N.C. Soccer Coach Denies Suit Charges, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 1998,
at IC, 1998 WL 5734003 (quoting athletic director Dick Batter).
35. Id.
36. Ericson, 35 F. Supp. at 327.
37. See Paul Riede, Former Players Help Case Against SU Depositions, Accuse Tennis
Coach Jesse Dwire of Sexual Harassment, Begun in '78, HERALD AM., Jan. 24, 1999, at Al, 1999
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accurate statistics on the number of athletes who are abused or harassed.
Harassment cases involving athletes are a small percentage of the
harassment cases filed with the Department of Education, the agency
charged with oversight of Title IX compliance. There are also relatively
few reported Title IX cases involving allegations of sexual harassment of
athletes by coaches. 39
There are, however, reasons to suspect that incidents of harassment of
athletes occur more frequently than are reported. 40 Surveys of athletes and
highly publicized media accounts of athletes alleging harassment, such as
those described in Jennings v. University of North Carolina41 and Ericson v.
WL 4663057 [hereinafter Former Players]. A university panel concluded that Dwire violated the
school's sexual harassment policy and its discrimination policy. The university's vice president for
human resources shortened the panel's recommended two-year suspension without pay to three
months. See Students: Harassment Has Gone Unpunished, TIMES UNION, Dec. 5, 1997, at C4, 1997
WL 14934092. Syracuse University settled the sexual harassment suit filed by two former Syracuse
tennis players. See Paul Riede, SU Tennis Suit Settled: Two Former Players Accused a Coach of
Inappropriate Massages, SYRACUSE HERALD-J., Mar. 26, 1999, at Cl, 1999 WL 4674157; John
Kekis, Syracuse Settles Harassment Suit, AP ONLINE, Mar. 26, 1999, 1999 WL 14515041.
38. According to the Department of Education, from October 1, 1994 through September
30, 1999, 927 sexual harassment claims were filed. Sexual harassment claims constituted 832 of the
927 claims. Females filed 683 of those 832 sexual harassment claims. Athletes filed 544 claims.
Female athletes filed only 7 claims of sexual harassment, and one of those claims was for
employment-related sexual harassment. In addition, the Office of Civil Rights initiated two sexual
harassment investigations of female athletes. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights,
Statistics on Sexual Harassment Claims by Female Athletes Under Title IX (October 11, 2000) (on
file with author).
39. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1123 (D. Utah 1994) (dismissing Title
IX harassment suit against a school district because the alleged facts did not support the claim that
actions were motivated by an intent to discriminate because of the victim's sex), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996); Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
772, 778 (W.D. Va. 1996) (dismissing Title IX suit against the University because the plaintiff failed
to allege facts to support the necessary discriminatory intent based upon sex), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Morrison,120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (dismissing Violence Against Women (VAWA) claims as
unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its powers under the commerce clause and enforcement
clause of the 14th Amendment); Seneway v. Canon McMillan Sch. Dist., 969 F. Supp. 325, 336
(1997) (denying motion for summary judgment of Title IX claim against school district because
there were genuine issues of material fact); Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 921-
22 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (granting summary judgment for Ohio State University on Title IX claims
because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of a hostile environment and quid pro quo
sexual harassment); Ericson, 35 F. Supp. at 330-31 (denying the defendant's motion for summary
judgment of Title IX claims because the allegations support a claim).
40. In a 1996 survey of American female college students on relations between female
athletes and college coaches, twenty percent reported they were subjected to potentially threatening
behavior. Eighteen percent experienced derogatory remarks and sexist jokes. Karin A.E. Volkwein et
al., Sexual Harassment in Sport: Perceptions and Experiences of American Female Student-Athletes,
32 INT'L REV. FOR SOC. SPORT 283, 291 (1997). A 1996 survey of 260 current and retired Canadian
Olympic competitors by a Canadian researcher revealed that just under twenty-two percent said they
had experienced sexual encounters with authority figures. See Olympic Officials Address Abuse
Involiing Athletes, ATLANTA J. & CONsT., Nov. 6, 1997, at 3E (citing the 1996 survey); see also
Deak, supra note 31 at 171-95 (discussing the problem of sexual abuse of athletes and suggesting
reforms).
41. No. 98 C 5261, 1999 WL 301669 (N.D. 111. Apr. 30, 1999).
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Syracuse University,42 add to the weight of the evidence suggesting that the
official numbers are under-representative of actual harassment that occurs in
these environments. 43 Among the potential reasons for the underreporting
are: 1) fear of reprisal; 44 2) uncertainty about the boundaries of appropriate
behavior;45 and 3) inade uate complaint procedures at the institution where
the harassment occurred. And even if more women came forward to allege
mistreatment by coaches, it is unclear whether Title IX would provide a
remedy for such claims. If the law offered a more viable remedy, the number
of women athletes filing harassment claims might well increase.
42. 35 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
43. See, e.g., supra notes 37 and 40.
44. Robin Finn, Public Hugs, Private Harm: Rise in Harassment Cases Accompanies Title
IX Victory, CHI. TRm., May 26, 1999, at 8, available at 1999 WL 2877186 (reporting on research
that concludes that statistics on sexual harassment are scarce in part because athletes are afraid to
lose their spots on teams).
45. Sociologists Alan Tomlinson and Ilkay Yorganci studied the relationships between
male coaches and female athletes in the United Kingdom. See Alan Tomlinson & llkay Yorganci,
Male Coach/Female Athlete Relations: Gender and Power Relations in Competitive Sport, 21 J. OF
SPORT & Soc. ISSUES 134, 143-44 (1997). Their study suggested that while most of the athletes
questioned denied suffering sexual harassment at the hands of their coaches, the behavior the women
did acknowledge experiencing might constitute sexual harassment in other contexts. For example,
almost one in four of those who denied any knowledge of sexual harassment experienced one or
more of the following in relation to their male coach: "demeaning language, verbal intrusion,
physical contact, and, much less widespread, fondling and pressure to have sexual intercourse."
Fifteen percent of those surveyed reported coaches use of demeaning language though
"embarrassing, derogatory remarks; sexual innuendoes; dirty jokes; 6% received an invitation to go
out or to engage in social activity; 17% reported incidents of physical touching such as butt-slapping,
tickling, hugging; 2% reported incidents of fondling; and less than 1% said they were pressured to
have sex." Id. at 145-49. In in-depth interviews with eighteen female athletes, ten experienced some
form of harassing or potentially harassing behavior by a coach, although not all ten perceived the
behavior as potentially harassing. lt at 149. The Tomlinson/Yorganci study then suggests that one
reason that few women file these claims is because they do not perceive certain behavior as
harassment. Id. at 146.
46. See WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION, Education and Prevention: Sexual Harassment
and Unethical Relationships Between Coaches and Athletes, in PREVENTION OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN ATHLETIC SE'rNGs: AN EDUCATIONAL RESOURCE KIT FOR ATHLETIC
ADMINISTRATORS (1994). Mariah Burton Nelson notes that many athletes do not report abuse
because they have been taught not to challenge a coach's authority. "Athletes also don't report abuse
because they have been well indoctrinated into male power. 'While one might expect a high level of
assertiveness and mental toughness from women who are competitive athletes, there is evidence that
the coach's authority, and even psychologically manipulative or abusive behavior, is rarely ......
challenged by these women."' MARIAH BURTON NELSON, THE STRONGER WOMEN GET, THE MORE
MEN LOVE FOOTBALL: SEXISM AND THE AMERICAN CULTURE OF SPORTS 186 (1994) (quoting
Helen Lenskyj); see also C. Eric Gronbech et al., College Female Athletes and Nonathletes as
Survivors of Sexual Harassment, 71 RES. Q. FOR EXERCISE & SPORT (2000) (concluding that female
athletes possess personality traits and physical attributes that differ from their non-athlete peers and
are not usually associated with victims). On the other hand, female athletes exhibit more risk-taking
behavior and are often in close proximity to male athletes, a group more likely to commit sexual
harassment, abuse and assault and are often coached by older men who have great influence on them
and potential for harassment. Id.
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B. The Reach and Limitations of Title IX
The treatment of discrimination under Title IX has borrowed heavily
from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.47 There are positive and
negative aspects to this association. One advantage is that anti-
discrimination principles or legal theories do not have to be reinvented by
practitioners or judges when applying the doctrine. 48 One disadvantage is
that there are important contextual differences between the educational and
employment environments.
Sexual harassment law is a theory of liability developed in the context
of employment discrimination under Title VII. 4 9 In Meritor v. Vinson,50 the
Court recognized that harassment in the workplace is a barrier to equality:
"Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality." 51 Similarly, sexual
harassment is a barrier to equal education. Sexual harassment can threaten a
student's physical or emotional well-being, influence how well a student
does in school and make it difficult for a student to achieve his or her career
goals. And, for athletes, sexual harassment negatively impacts athletic
performance, their relationships and their self-esteem.53 While there is little
disagreement that sexual harassment has a negative impact upon athletes,
there is much disagreement as to what constitutes harassment. The next
section examines different conceptions of harassment.
C. Defining Harassment
Sexual harassment can take two forms: quid pro quo54 or hostile
47. Equal Employment Opportunities, Title VIL 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1994).
48. See L Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58
OHIO ST. LJ. 819, 819-821 (1997) (arguing that drawing analogies between new or novel legal
claims and established legal theories is a method of gaining legitimacy for the new claims).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15.
50. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
51. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
52. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT'S NOT ACADEMIC 1
(1999). arailable at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/docs/ocrshpam.html.
53. Celia Brackenridge & Kari Fasting, Background Studies on the Problem of Sexual
Harassment in Sport, Especially with Regard to Women and Children, report prepared for 9TH
COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR SPORT (2000), at
http:llculture.coe.rf/sportlconflenglmsl9.3htm (stating that many female athletes who endure sexual
abuse suffer psychological disorders for years afterwards).
54. Quid pro quo was the first theory of sexual harassment to develop. To make out a claim
of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the plaintiff must show that a supervisor (meaning someone with
at least apparent authority) made an unwelcome demand on the basis of sex and that as a result of
refusing the demand, plaintiff suffered, or reasonably feared she would suffer, adverse consequences
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environment. 55 The Office of Civil Rights defines quid pro quo harassment
as an incident when "a teacher or other employee conditions an educational
decision or benefit on the student's submission to unwelcome sexual
conduct. ' 56 Hostile environment sexual harassment is defined as "sexually
harassing conduct by an employee, another student, or a third party" "that
does not explicitly or implicitly condition a decision or benefit on
submission to sexual conduct" and "is sufficiently serious that it denies or
limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's
program based on sex."57
These definitions borrow heavily from Title VII definitions of quid pro
quo and hostile environm ent sexual harassment in the employment context.
58
if she refused. For example, a supervisor who demands sexual favors in return for a job benefit or to
avoid a job detriment would be perpetrating quid pro quo sexual harassment. See Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57(1986) (alleging that a supervisor coerced plaintiff, an assistant branch
manager in a bank, into a sexual relationship); see also Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that "quid pro quo harassment occurs whenever an individual explicitly or implicitly
conditions a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment upon an employee's acceptance of
sexual conduct").
55. Beginning with Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme Court also recognized hostile
environment sexual harassment claims under Title VII. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. This decision
expanded the scope of liability to include harassment whether or not it was directly linked to the
granting or denial of a job benefit. Id. In Meritor Savings Bank, the plaintiff, Michelle Vinson,
alleged that her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, pressured her into a sexual relationship that lasted for
three years. Id. at 59-60. Although her advancement at the bank was based on merit, and not based
on her relationship with Taylor, and although the harassment ceased a year before her eventual
termination, suggesting she suffered no adverse job consequence as a direct result of her refusal, she
nevertheless alleged Taylor's conduct contributed to a hostile working environment. Id. at 60. The
Court held that, to be actionable, sexual harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive environment."' Id. at 67. In
order to claim hostile environment harassment, the plaintiff must show the following: 1) that the
conduct was unwelcome; 2) that it was based on sex; 3) that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment; and 4) that the
employer is liable for the harassment. Id. at 67-70.
56. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997), available at http:llwww.ed.gov/
offices/OCR/sexhar0l.html. The report, which contains the policy guidance report issued by the
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, was published in 1997, before the Supreme Court decision in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). In this policy guidance report, the
Office of Civil Rights argues that institutions can be vicariously liable for sexual harassment. The
Gebser decision, however, rejects the vicarious liability standard for institutional liability for
damages under Title IX and establishes an actual notice requirement. See infra notes 137, 150-154
and accompanying text. The Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students By
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 66 Fed. Reg. 5512-01 (Jan. 19, 2001), available
at http:lwww.ed.gov/ocr/shguide (last visited Apr. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Revised Sexual
Harassment Guidance], incorporates the Gebser actual notice requirement into Office of Civil Rights
policy.
57. Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 56.
58. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the enforcement agency for
Title VII, defines sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985). The EEOC
provides that such unwelcome conduct constitutes sexual harassment when:
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
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But unique aspects of athletics, including the special nature of the
relationship between coaches and athletes and characteristics of the athletic
environment, make Title VH standards an imperfect fit for assessing sexual
harassment in athletics under Title IX.59
1. "My Coach Says He Loves Me":6° Sexual Relationships Between
Coaches and Athletes
Sexual relationships between coaches and athletes are not a per se
violation of Title IX. Only unwelcome sexual conduct violates Title IX.
Conduct is unwelcome "if the student did not request or invite it and
'regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive.' ''61
"Unwelcomeness" is a concept first developed under Title VII sexual
harassment law 6z and imported into Title IX sexual harassment law. The
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decision affecting such individual,
or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
Id.
59. Both quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment claims are recognized by some
courts under Title IX. Although courts universally accept quid pro quo harassment theory under Title
IX. they do not uniformly accept hostile environment theory under Title IX. See, e.g., Bougher v.
Univ. of Pitt., 713 F. Supp. 139, 145 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 74, 77 (3d
Cir. 1989) (holding that while Title IX reaches quid pro quo claims, it does not permit hostile
environment claims). But cf. Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F. 2d 881, 896 (lst Cir. 1988)
(permitting a Title IX hostile environment claim). The Supreme Court has never expressly held that
the substantive provisions of Title VII apply in Title IX cases, but the Court has used language to
lend support to this view. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., a high school teacher and coach
resigned from his position on the condition that all pending sexual harassment claims under Title IX
be dropped. 503 U.S. 60, 64 (1992). The student alleging sexual harassment then attempted to
recover monetary damages. The Supreme Court concluded that monetary damages are available
under Title IX. Id. at 76. The Court in Franklin referenced Title VII cases in describing the nature of
the school's duty to prevent sexual harassment. Id. at 75. The Court found that:
Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty not to discriminate on
the basis of sex, and 'when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex' ... We believe
the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.
Id. [citation omitted]. Lower courts latched onto this language as support for the view that Title VII
jurisprudence is the appropriate starting point for defining the limits of sexual harassment under Title
IX. See, eg., Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
The Court in Patricia H. described the Franklin decision as follows: "While not explicitly
addressing the relationship between Title VII analysis and Title IX analysis, however, the Supreme
Court... turned to Title VII law to explain its ruling on Franklin's harassment claim ..." Id
60. NELSON, supra note 46, at 159-94 (describing the problem of romantic relationships
between coaches and athletes).
61. Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 56.
62. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the district court denied relief, concluding that even
if the alleged victim and the supervisor engaged in a sexual relationship, that the relationship was
voluntary. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Supreme Court rejected the district court's conclusion that
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Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson first addressed the issue
of unwelcomeness as an element of sexual harassment cases. 64 In that case,
the district court concluded that plaintiff Michelle Vinson's sexual
relationship with her supervisor was voluntary, which precluded Vinson
from maintaining an action for sexual harassment. 65 The Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of the district court, finding that "the
fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to
a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome."'66
Title VII assumes that consensual sexual relationships do and will
develop in the workplace and seeks to distinguish those relationships from
harmful harassment. 7 By placing the burden on the alleged victim of sexual
harassment to show that the conduct was unwelcome, Title VII further
presumes that most relationships are consensual unless the alleged victim
can show differently.
68
The "unwelcomeness" requirement is troublesome when applied to
harassment cases under Title IX. The presumption that most sexual
relationships are consensual should not necessarily apply in educational
athletic situations. The "unwelcomeness" concept presumes that when an
advance is made, the recipient is fully empowered to turn it down, and so
therefore, there is no harm in the asking. Factors of power, trust, and control
that characterize the coach/athlete relationship may remove the possibility of
a female athlete freely giving consent to sexual contact.
69
voluntariness was a defense to a claim of sexual harassment, requiring only that the sexual advances
were "unwelcome." Id. at 68.
63. According to the Office of Civil Rights, conduct is unwelcome "if the student did not
request or invite it and 'regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."' Revised Sexual
Harassment Guidance, supra note 56.
64. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 68. For a description of the development of the
unwelcomeness doctrines, see Joan S. Weiner, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual
Harassment Law: Its History and Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621,624 (1997).
65. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 68.
66. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §1604.11 (a) (1985)).
67. See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomenesss in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 503-5 (1994) (arguing that a requirement that sexual
harassment victims prove "unwelcomeness" perpetuates the myth that sexual attention is a normal
part of the workplace and that most people are not offended by attention of a sexual nature).
68. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 827-28 (1991) (arguing that the
problem with the unwelcomeness requirement is that 1) it focuses on the victim, not the perpetrator;
2) by focusing on unwelcome conduct it implies that a verbal rebuff, a polite "no," may not suffice
and 3) it makes the victims dress and speech an issue (emphasis added)).
69. See PETER RUrTER, SEX tN THE FORBIDDEN ZONE: WHEN MEN IN POWER-
THERAPISTS, DOCTORS, CLERGY, TEACHERS AND OTHERS-BETRAY WOMEN'S TRUST 25 (1986)
(explaining how men take advantage of the power of their public roles to control women who entrust
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The coach, like the workplace supervisor, is an authority figure who
exercises a degree of control over a subordinate. But the nature and extent of
the control is very different. A workplace supervisor is a colleague. A
workplace supervisor's control is generally limited by time and geography
(limited to the workplace during business hours). Both the supervisor and
the employee are generally adults, so there is not a concern that the age of
the employee contributes to the employee's vulnerability.
Coaches, on the other hand, occupy a position of trust and control over
athletes. The control of the coach extends to all aspects of the athlete's life-
training regimen, diet, even social life. 70 From the athlete's perspective, the
relationship is characterized by both emotional and physical dependence. An
athlete comes to depend on her coach as the person who holds the key to her
athletic success. 71 A coach, for example, offers tangible rewards for good
performance, such as team selection, entry into competitions, representative
honors and medals, and dispenses punishment, such as withdrawing
scholarships or dropping an athlete from the team.
72
The desire to maintain that relationship renders athletes vulnerable to
the introduction of sexual behavior into coach/athlete relationship.73 Not all
romantic relationships between coaches and athletes are built on coercion
and abuse,74 but the nature of the power imbalance between athlete and
coach renders athletes vulnerable to such abuse.75 Age disparities further
their confidences to them).
70. Tomlinson & Yorganci, supra note 45, at 143-44 (1997) (explaining that in a survey of
137 female track athletes, 59% said their coach influenced their diet or weight, 34% said the coach
influenced their sleep and 25% said the coach influenced their social life).
71. See id. at 147 (describing the relationship between male coaches and female athletes as
one of "dependence and domination").
72. See Brackenridge & Fasting, supra note 53, at § 1.3.
73. RUTrER, supra note 69, at 51. This vulnerability is not limited to coach/athlete
relationships but extends to any relationship in which one party exercises undue control or power.
Psychiatrist Peter Rutter describes the extraordinary pressure placed on women in these special
relationships to accede to a sexual relationship with the men who exercise such power over them.
Each woman I interviewed who engaged in forbidden-zone sex described the
immeasurable nonsexual value she felt that relationship had attained before any sexual
behavior took place. All of them felt that they acceded to sex as a way of maintaining a
relationship that had come to have extraordinary importance in their lives and seemed
to them to open up new and boundless possibilities to the future.
Id.
74. There are many contemporary examples of relationships between athletes and current
or former coaches. Olympic track star Jackie Joyner-Kersee met her husband Bob Kersee while he
was an assistant track coach and she was a basketball player. They married after she graduated from
UCLA. See MARiAH NELSON, ARE WE WINNING YET? How WOMEN ARE CHANGING SPORTS AND
SPORTS ARE CHANGING WOMEN 161-162 (1991).
75. Author Mariah Burton Nelson interviewed players, coaches and administrators about
the existence of sexual relationships between coaches and athletes. "One swimming coach
estimate[d] that two-thirds of the male coaches he knows have been sexually involved with athletes
or former athletes." NELSON, supra note 46, at 166. Nelson also interviewed "Noel Moran Quilici, a
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contribute to an athlete's vulnerability.
76
Female athletes, who are typically much younger than their coaches, are
vulnerable to being enticed into inappropriate sexual relationships with
them.77 For younger athletes, the impropriety of those relationships is
beyond question. Indeed, many coaches who engage in such relationships
are criminally prosecuted for child abuse.78 Even for athletes who are above
the age of consent, the power imbalance in coach/athlete relationships calls
into question whether the relationships are truly consensual. 79 Social
former nationally ranked swimmer," who "fell in love with" her coach. Id. at 170-71. Quilici
described how Mitchell Ivey, her coach, controlled their personal relationship just as he controlled
their professional relationship. Id. They separated six months after their marriage when she walked
in on him and another swimmer being romantically intimate. Id. Quilici described her coach's
appeal:
It's such an intense relationship. You travel, you're together all the time. If you're
young, and this older man says he loves you... He was very, very persuasive and
manipulative. I wish I knew then what I know now. I thought I was special to him. I
wasn't. I was just another notch in his stick.
Id. Psychiatrist Peter Rutter also argues that most marriages that arise out of a professional
relationship fail. RuTrER, supra note 69, at 174-77.
76. Most competitive athletes begin training at a young age and reach their peak by their
mid- to late-twenties. See Jack C. Horn, The Peak Years: Research on Age at Which Athletes Are at
Their Best, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1988, at 62 (reporting the results of research conducted by
researchers at the University of Pittsburgh). Analysis of records from track and field, swimming,
baseball, tennis, and golf suggests that athletes in these sports tend to peak in their late twenties. Id.
Swimmers, sprinters, and jumpers peaked in late teens or early twenties, while golfers and baseball
players tend to peak in their late twenties and early thirties. Id. In track and field, for example, the
mean age of winners in the 1,500 meters from 1948-1980 was 24.6 years. Id. While the average age
increased with the length of the race, runners in longer races (5,000 meter, 10,000 meter, and
marathon) peaked at twenty-seven. Id. Baseball players tended to peak at age twenty-seven or
twenty-eight. Women golfers averaged around 30 years, with men about one year older. Id.
77. Celia Brackenridge argues that female athletes are more susceptible to being enticed
into an abusive sexual relationship when they have reached a high standard of performance but are
just below the elite level, a stage she describes as the "Stage of Imminent Achievement" (SIA).
Brackenridge & Kirby, supra note 28, at 407-18. Brackenridge further argues that athletes whose
SIA coincides with or precedes their age of sexual maturity are at a greater risk of sexual abuse than
those whose SIA or peak sport age follow their age of sexual maturity. Id.
78. See, e.g., Scadden v. Wyoming, 732 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Wyo. 1987) (involving a high
school coach convicted of second-degree assault for having a sexual relationship with a student).
The focus on the criminal culpability of individual coaches fails to challenge the sporting culture that
permits coaches to prey upon athletes; Finn, supra note 44, at 8 (describing the cases of a high
school coach accused of harassing a female basketball player and charged with criminal sexual
misconduct, and a tennis coach who pled guilty to aggravated sexual assault for involvement in a
sexual relationship with an underage tennis player).
79. Whether the harassment takes place between a supervisor and employee, teacher and
student, or coach and athlete, the primary concern in all three kinds of relationships is the power
disparity between the authority figure and the subordinate, which may contribute to the coerciveness
of the relationship. See Angela J. Duffy, Can a Child Say Yes? How the Unwelcomeness
Requirement Has Thwarted the Purpose of Title IX, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 505, 510 (1998) (arguing that
forcing students from elementary through high school to prove "unwelcomeness" frustrates the
intent of Title IX); Tomlinson & Yorganci, supra note 45, at 134. However, the power disparity is
greatest between coach and athlete. Id. In the education context, the age of the student may
contribute to the perceived vulnerability of the student, at least those students who are at or below
the age of consent. For older students, the concern about true consent may not be as great. But see
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scientists recognize the extraordinary power exercised by other types of
authority figures over those with whom they enjoy a special relationship. 80
These abuses of trust are viewed as professional ethical violations." The
power imbalance in coach/athlete relationships should also be considered a
factor in whether the "unwelcomeness" standard is met. The nature of the
relationship between coach and athlete should weigh in favor of dispensing
with the "unwelcomeness" requirement, or, at the very least, shifting the
burden of proving "unwelcomeness" away from the athlete.82 Unlike in the
employment context, sexual relationships between coaches and athletes
RUTTER, supra note 69, at 29-30 (noting that the important social dynamic between student and
professor as well as the psychological dynamic based on underlying dependency issues suggest that
relationships between professors and adult female students are nevertheless problematic). While
teachers exercise a great deal of control over students during school hours, they tend not to exert the
same level of control as coaches have over athletes. For athletes, even relationships between coaches
and athletes above the age of consent may raise concerns. See Tomlinson & Yorganci, supra note
45, at 134-155.
80. For example, psychiatrist Peter Rutter describes sexual relationships between such
professionals and their patients or students as a "forbidden zone" relationship. RUrTER, supra note
69, at 28. The forbidden zone is a condition of relationship in which sexual behavior is prohibited
because a man holds in trust the intimate, wounded, vulnerable, or undeveloped parts of a woman.
Id. He explains that
The trust derives from the professional role of the man as doctor, therapist, lawyer,
clergy, teacher, or mentor, and it creates an expectation that whatever parts of herself
the woman entrusts to him (her property, body, mind, or spirit) must be used solely to
advance her interests and will not be used to his advantage, sexual or otherwise. Under
these conditions, sexual behavior is always wrong, no matter who initiates it, no matter
how willing the participants say they are. In the forbidden zone, the factors of power,
trust, and dependency remove the possibility of a woman freely giving consent to
sexual contact. Put another way, the dynamics of the forbidden zone can render a
woman unable to withhold consent. And because the man has the greater power, the
responsibility is his to guard the forbidden boundary against sexual contact, no matter
how provocative the woman.
Id. See also Sue Rosenberg Zalk, Men in the Academy: A Psychological Profile of Harassers, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES: ABUSING THE IVORY POWER 81-113 (Michele A.
Paludi ed., 1996) (arguing that the patriarchal structure of many academic institutions as well as the
power delegated to the predominantly male faculty create an environment conducive to sexual
harassment).
81. For example, ethical rules in many states prohibit sexual relationships between
attorneys and clients. See, e.g., Abed Awad, Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 22 J. LEGAL PROF.
131, 131-171 (1998) (surveying state laws prohibiting attorney-client sexual relationships).
82. In its investigations, the Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
employs presumptions against "welcomeness" for younger students and employs a factor test for
"welcomeness" for older students. If elementary students are involved, the sexual conduct is never
considered consensual. In cases involving secondary students, OCR employs a strong presumption
against consent. In cases involving post-secondary students, OCR follows the factor test. It looks at:
* The nature of the conduct and the relationship of the school employee to the
student, including the degree of influence (which could, at least in part, be
affected by the student's age), authority, or control the employee has over the
student.
" Whether the student was legally or practically unable to consent to the sexual
conduct in question.
Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 56.
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should be presumed to be non-consensual, with the burden placed upon the
coach to demonstrate "welcomeness," instead of the current burden on the
athlete to prove "unwelcomeness."
While the control and dependence that mark coach/athlete relationships
apply to both male and female athletes, female athletes are particularly
vulnerable. Women athletes are more likely to be coached by men than male
athletes are to be coached by women,83 creating more opportunities for
heterosexual coach/athlete relationships to develop for female athletes than
for male athletes. 4 This is not to say that male athletes are never subjected
to abuse-they areS-or that female coaches do not abuse-they do.
86
Same-sex harassment also occurs, but opposite-sex harassment is still the
more common occurrence.
87
2. Hugs, Kisses, and Other Touches
While the "unwelcomeness" standard can be modified to address the
problem of sexual relationships between coaches and athletes,88 this will not
solve the more intractable problem of setting the boundaries of appropriate
physical touching between male coaches and female athletes. This is another
area in which the experiences of women athletes may deviate from those of
their male counterparts. A certain amount of physical touching between
coach and athlete is accepted and even considered necessary in many
sports.89 For example, a coach may need to position a player to execute a
83. One consequence of the increasing numbers of women and girls playing athletics as a
result of Title IX is that it has created numerous coaching opportunities. Men overwhelmingly have
filled these positions. While women coached over 90% of women's teams before Title IX was
enacted, as of 1996, women held 3,138 of 6,580 positions coaching women's teams, or 47.7%.
Women hold only 2% of head coach positions for men's teams within the NCAA. R. VIVIAN
ACOSTA & LINDA JEAN CARPENTER, WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT: A LONGITUDINAL
STuDY - NINETEEN YEAR UPDATE 1977-1996, at http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.eduL/ge/acosta/womensp.
html (last visited Apr. 7, 2001).
84. See Marc Bloom, When Athletes Are One Sex, and Coaches Are the Other, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1999, §15, at 20; NELSON, supra note 74, at 159-74.
85. Professional hockey player Sheldon Kennedy, for example, revealed that he was forced
into a sexual relationship with his male junior hockey league coach. Kennedy Recounts Sexual Abuse
from Former Junior Team Coach, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 7, 1997, at 1, available at LExIs Newsfile.
86. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 46, at 188 (describing a female swimming coach found
guilty of statutory rape after admitting having sex with a boy she coached).
87. See id at 188-189.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68.
89. See, e.g., Brackenridge & Kirby, Example 7. Touching, in An Analysis of Codes of
Practice for Preventing Sexual Harassment and Abuse to Women and Children in Sport, supra note
53, at Part I, §5.2. (listing various national codes of sporting conduct about appropriate touching of
athletes). The Canadian code instructs: "All physical contact between athletes or between personnel
and athletes should be for one of the following purposes: [1)] to develop sport skills/techniques[; 2)]
to give sport massages[; 3)] to treat an injury." Id. But as the Ericson case demonstrates, massages in
a sports context are not always non-sexual. Ericson v. Syracuse University, 35 F. Supp. 2d 326
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defensive move or to demonstrate a new technique. Similarly a hug or a pat
on the back to demonstrate approval is not per se inappropriate. But other
forms of physical touching, such as massages and slaps on the buttocks, fall
within a gray area between appropriate and inappropriate behavior.
In men's sports, such touches between men are presumed non-sexual in
nature.9° Although these types of touches stray into what might be
considered private areas and risk potential sexual arousal, male dominated
sports operate on a heterosexual presumption.9 1 According to this
presumption, men are sexually attracted to women, therefore men slapping
each other on the butt or submitting to a massage by a male trainer are
touches presumed non-sexual in nature.92
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,93 the Supreme Court
recognized in dicta that in the context of sport certain types of touching, not
permissible in the work environment, may be permissible on the athletic
field.94 Joseph Oncale worked as a "roustabout" on a crew on an oil platform
in the Gulf of Mexico. 95 Oncale alleged that on several occasions his co-
workers "forcibly subjected [him] to sex-related, humiliating actions." 96 The
case involved the application of Title VII sexual harassment law to instances
of same-sex harassment.97 In support of its view that same-sex harassment
must be viewed within the social context in which it arises, the Court stated:
A professional football player's working environment is not
severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks
him on the buttocks as he heads on to the field-even if the same
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
90. See BRIAN PRONGER, THE ARENA OF MASCULINITY: SPORTS, HOMOSEXUALITY, AND
THE MEANING OF SEX 9 (1990) (describing the effect of the heterosexual presumption on gay male
athletes). The operation of this heterosexual presumption impacts gay male athletes as well.
The body contact of football, hockey, boxing, and water polo, the practice of gymnastic
routines, springboard diving, and figure skating, the attention coaches may lavish on
their athletes, the exposure of naked sportsmen in locker rooms and showers, all
proceed under the assumption that no one involved is aware of the erotic potential of
these phenomena, that everyone is heterosexual.
Id.
91. Id.
92. See also Brian Pronger, Gay Jocks: A Phenomenology of Gay Men in Athletics, in
SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER: CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 146-52 (Michael A.
Messner & Donald F. Sabo eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER]
(describing gay male strategies for coping in the locker room, including "passing" as straight).
93. 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding sex discrimination consisting of same-sex harassment is
actionable under Title VI).
94. Id. at 81-82.
95. Id. at 77.
96. Id. "When asked at his deposition why he left Sundowner, Oncale stated: 'I felt that if I
didn't leave my job, that I would be raped or forced to have sex."' Id.
97. Id. at 79-80.
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behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the
coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office.98
Therefore, the Court agrees with the presumption that behavior on the
playing field is non-sexual. 99
In contrast, harassment law operates on a presumption of sexual
desire.1° When a male supervisor makes sexual advances toward a female
subordinate, harassment law presumes that the attention is sexual in nature.
It presumes that the supervisor (who is presumed heterosexual) would not
have directed such attention to a man.1°1 When the advance takes place
between a supervisor and employee of the same sex, the plaintiff generally
must make the additional showing that the harassment was directed at him or
her because of sex.102 Further, in order to establish "but for" causation for
same-sex harassment, a plaintiff may have to show the alleged harasser was
gay. 1
03
When touches occur between a male coach and a female athlete,
conflicting messages are communicated to both the athlete and the coach-
the athletic presumption (non-sexual) and the harassment presumption
(sexual). Indeed, one of the allegations raised in Ericson v. Syracuse
University'°4 was that the coach sexually harassed them by giving them
massages that were sexual in nature.10 5 Title IX has no solution for this
problem. The harassment presumption sexualizes male coaches'touching of
women athletes. The athletic presumption suggests that such touches are
within the realm of appropriate touching. 1°6 Further, the response to this
problem can affect the type of training women receive. A coach may
respond to such a concern by not treating female athletes as they would a
98. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
99. Id.
100. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1692-
1710 (1998) (arguing that the prevailing paradigm of sexual harassment law is based on a sexual
desire-dominance paradigm that presumes that a male supervisor's advances toward a female
subordinate are based on sexual desire because the supervisor would not make similar sexual
advances toward a man); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 691, 734-35 (1997) (arguing that sexual harassment should not be understood merely as an
expression of sexual desire but as an expression of sexism).
101. See Franke, supra note 100, at 736.
102. Id. at 735-37.
103. Id. at 736-37.
104. 35 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
105. See Former SU Tennis Players Discuss Sexual Harassment Two Players Said Coach
Dwire Gave Unwanted Massages, SYRACUSE HERALD-J., Dec. 5, 1997, 1997 WL 578145 1.
106. I realize this is an oversimplification of the problem. In the male context, the touches of
a male coach or trainer can cross the line, but the point I make is that the question of where to draw
that line between appropriate and inappropriate conduct is important.
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male athlete for fear of being accused of sexual harassment.1°7 Ironically, the
presumptions that operate in harassment law in these situations may impede
women's athletic advancement if male coaches treat them differently than
male athletes due to concerns about being accused of sexual harassment. On
the other hand, the touching of private areas of an athlete's body by a coach
does raise legitimate concerns that the touches are for the sexual gratification
of the coach rather than related to the improvement of athletic performance.
3. "You Play Like a Girl": Gender-Based Harassment Under Title IX
Mistreatment of athletes does not always take the form of a sexual
relationship. Popular coaching techniques often focus on verbal abuse, such
as belittling or denigrating a player. Sometimes the belittling can be
gendered in nature (e.g., "you play like a girl"). In Ericson v. Syracuse
University,1°8 in addition to claims of unwanted sexual conduct, the athletes
also complained about abusive behavior of a non-sexual nature.109 As part of
their evidence supporting the existence of a hostile work environment, the
plaintiffs described incidents in which the coach made demeaning comments
about women. 110 For example, as part of what apparently was intended as a
motivational speech, the coach, Jesse Dwier, said that the name of the Gap
clothing brand stands for "Girls Are Pathetic."
' I
The Office of Civil Rights recognizes that gender-based harassment not
involving conduct of a sexual nature may violate Title IX, including
comments that evidence a general hostility to the presence of women.12
Comments such as, "You play like a girl," or "You play like a sissy," are an
accepted part of sports. When directed at men, they signal that feminine
characteristics are incompatible with athletics. 113 Gender-based hostility,
107. See Todd Taylor, Men Coaching Women Deal With Pitfalls: Dorrance Case Putting
Focus on Gender Issues, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., Sept. 4, 1998, available at LEXIS News
Group File (discussing coaches' strategies to minimize risk of sexual harassment charges, including
not meeting alone with female athletes and taking a different psychological approach to coaching
women).
108. 35 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
109. Riede, Former Players, supra note 37.
110. Id.
111. A university hearing panel found that this speech by Dwier was sexist. Id.
112. See Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 56.
Gender-based harassment, which may include acts of verbal, nonverbal, or physical
aggression, intimidation, or hostility based on sex or sex-stereotyping, but not involving
conduct of a sexual nature, is also a form of sex discrimination to which a school must
respond, if it rises to a level that denies or limits a student's ability to participate in or
benefit from the educational program.
Id. (citation omitted).
113. NANCY LEvrr, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAw 54 (1998) (arguing
that taunts such as "wimp," "pussy," and "faggot" teach boys that being good at sports is connected
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then, is a fundamental aspect of the athletic environment. This model of
athletic participation (accentuating the masculine by devaluing the feminine)
conflicts with the operation of harassment law which seeks to root out such
gender stereotypes and break down barriers to women's full participation in
society.
4. A Hostile Athletic Environment?
Not all conduct that may be described as harassment will create a
hostile environment, only severe or pervasive conduct will suffice. 14 It must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment. 115 In other words,
the conduct must offend the plaintiff herself and must be sufficiently
offensive such that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would also
take offense.116 In Oncale. the Court described a hostile work environment
as follows:
We have emphasized, moreover, that the objective severity of
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the plaintiffs position, considering "all the
circumstances."... In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that
inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in
which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its
target.
The reason for adopting this contextual framework, according to the Court,
is to distinguish harassment from "genuine but innocuous differences in the
ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and
of the opposite sex."
1 18
Title VII's reasonableness standard operates imperfectly in the context
of athletics. The reasonable person standard sets a community standard of
behavior as the norm.11 9 Harassment, then, is behavior that deviates from
with not being a girl).
114. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 81-82.
117. Id. at 81.
118. Id.
119. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F2d 611, 620-622 (6th Cir. 1986). Susan Estrich
argues that viewing harassment within its social context is a mistake because the social interaction
within the workplace differs from the social interaction that takes place outside the workplace. At
work, women are a captive audience.
But in defining what counts as trivial or "de minimis," many courts have wrongly
looked to social interaction outside the workplace as the standard, ignoring not only the
"captive audience" nature of the employment context but also the fact that "society"
hardly reflects a normative standard which women have had an equal role in shaping.
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that norm. 12  Harassment is judged in the social context in which the
harassing behavior occurs. But what may be considered "reasonable" in
athletics may not be considered "reasonable" in an office environment.
12 1
Some coaches consider an aggressive, in-your face style of coaching
necessary to motivate athletes. 122 Similarly, some consider hazing and other
Estrich, supra note 68, at 843 (arguing that in Title VII cases, courts incorrectly assume that the
work environment is a neutral construct).
120. See Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 166-67 (Mich. 1993) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1994)) (stating that the reasonable person standard is appropriate
because "it enables triers of fact" 'to look to a community standard rather than an individual one).
121. Some employers have argued that the social context of the workplace is relevant to the
determination of what constitutes harassment. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622 (holding obscenities
directed in a workplace against a female plaintiff and sexually oriented posters had a de minimus
effect on the work environment when society condones public displays of vulgarity on newsstands
and on television), rev'don other grounds, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Gross v.
Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995). "[We must evaluate Gross' claim of
gender discrimination in the context of a blue collar environment where crude language is commonly
used by male and female employees. Speech that might be offensive or unacceptable in a prep
school faculty meeting, or on the floor of Congress, is tolerated in other work environments." Id.
Viewing harassment in its social context validates the status quo. It has the ironic consequence of
affording a person less protection in a more abusive and intolerant work environment. If the work
environment typically tolerates abusive language and horseplay, then a plaintiff offended by such
behavior presumably will not be able to meet this standard of harassment.
Some courts, however, refuse to consider the aggressiveness of the workplace setting in
determining whether there is harassment. In Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999), the
plaintiff, a female guard at a county jail claimed she was subjected to hostile work environment
harassment when a coworker subjected her to verbal and physical abuse. The district court partially
discounted the seriousness of the actions because the plaintiff "voluntarily" stepped into the
"aggressive setting" of the jail. Id. at 534-35. The appellate court rejected this consideration. Id.
It is true that the severity of the alleged harassment must be assessed in light of the
social mores of American workers and workplace culture, but nothing in Oncale even
hints at the idea that prevailing culture can excuse discriminatory actions.... There is
no assumption-of-risk defense to charges of workplace discrimination.
Id. (citation omitted).
122. For example, consider the career of Bobby Knight. Bobby Knight, the embattled men's
basketball coach at Indian University, lost his job when he taught a freshman student "a lesson in
'manners and civility."' The student had spotted the basketball coach on campus and said, "Hey,
what's up. Knight?" Bob Knight allegedly grabbed the student by the arm and dragged him aside
and told the student to show him some respect. Alexander Wolff, Knight Fall: Bob Knight's
Controversial 29-Year Reign at Indiana Came to an Ironic End When He Gave a Student an
Unmannerly Lesson in Manners, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 18, 2000. Bob Knight justified his
aggressive tactics after his firing:
I've maybe done a thousand things in my career to motivate kids-to get them to be
better players-to get teams to be better. And athletic competition is not forensic
speaking. Athletic competition is tough. Athletic competition is blood and it's sweat
and it's guys out there pounding each other. I bet a great percentage of those thousand
things I've done would not be something you'd really talk about at a PTA or at a garden
party or at the church social.
Audio file: Bobby Knight, at http:lwww.cnnsi.comlbasketballcollegenews/2000/O3/16knight_
accusation/bobknight3.wav (last visited Apr. 6, 2001). Despite Mr. Knight's extreme tactics, his
"style" won him a following as evidence by the reaction to his firing. See Wolff, supra.
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ritualistic behavior to be necessary to build team loyalty and toughness.' 23
Viewing sexual harassment law within its social context results in moving
the boundaries of acceptable conduct to allow a consideration of the norms
of the athletic field.
An illustrative situation is found in Seamons v. Snow.124 Brian
Seamons, a high school student, sued his high school, school district,
principal, and football coach under Title IX in connection with a locker
room hazing incident. 125 As Seamons, a backup quarterback at Sky View
High School in Smithfield, Utah, was leaving the shower area, four of his
teammates used athletic tape to bind him to a towel rack. 12 6 A fifth teammate
brought a girl Seamons had taken to the homecoming dance into the locker
room to witness his humiliation. 12 7 Seamons and his parents reported the
incident to the principal and other school officials, including the football
coach, Douglas Snow. 12 8 Snow, however, brought Seamons before the
football team, accused him of betraying the team by bringing the incident to
the attention of the administration and told Seamons to apologize to the
team. When Seamons refused, Snow dismissed Seamons from the team.
129
In response to the incidents, the school district superintendent cancelled the
remainder of the football season.130 According to Seamons, he was branded
as the cause of the premature end of the football season and was subjected to
threats and other harassment.
1 31
In his complaint, Seamons alleged both sex discrimination and sexual
harassment. 132 Seamons theorized that the defendants (the high school, the
123. Hazing is an initiation ritual that permits new or potential members to demonstrate
commitment to the group. See Jamie Bryshun & Kevin Young, Sport-Related Hazing: An Inquiry
Into Male and Female Involvement, in SPORT AND GENDER IN CANADA 269-92 (Philip White and
Kevin Young eds., 1999) Initiation rituals occur in many contexts beyond sports. "In many societies
and cultures ... , veteran members of social groups require new members to demonstrate their
commitment to the group." In sports, "the values, attitudes, knowledge and behaviors" of the team
"are produced and reproduced through ritualized initiations." Hazing is a ritual initiation that
depends on degrading, abusing, or endangering the initiate. See ALFRED UNIVERSITY, supra note 27,
at 8.
124. 864 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Utah 1994), affid in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 84 F.
3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court's dismissal of all claims, but reversing and
remanding Seamons's First Amendment claim)."
125. 84 F.3d at 1230.





131. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996).
132. Id. at 1226. The complaint also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. §
1985 and violations of various constitutional and civil rights, including a First Amendment free
speech claim. Id. at 1231. The district court dismissed both of Seamons's federal claims (Title IX
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school district, principal, and football coach) were guilty of sex
discrimination because they expected him to conform to a macho male
stereotype, as evidenced by the suggestion to him that he should have "taken
it like a man" and Snow's explanation of the event as "boys will be boys."
' 133
His complaint, however, was dismissed.1 34 The appellate court concluded
that such statements furthered the goals of promoting team loyalty and
toughness.' 35 Seamons's complaint, according to the district court, failed
because he was unable to show that he suffered any discriminatory act
because of his sex. 36 Thus, as demonstrated by Seamons, the aggressive
male model of athletics where harassment is the norm potentially serves as
the baseline for a hostile athletic environment.
D. Institutional Responsibility
While Title IX borrows many of the substantive theories of sexual
harassment developed under Title VII, one area in which Title IX
harassment law diverges from Title VII harassment law is in the standards
for institutional liability. Differences in the statutory language have led
courts to impose a higher standard of institutional liability under Title IX
than under Title VII, making it more difficult for students to hold
educational institutions liable for damages for sexual harassment.137 Title
VI, which prohibits sex discrimination in employment, explicitly holds the
employer responsible not only for its own actions but also for the acts of its
agents. 13 Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees.., and any agent of
and §§ 1983 and 1985) and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claims. Id. While
the dismissal of Seamons's sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims under Title IX were
upheld by the court of appeals, the district court's dismissal of Seamons's First Amendment claim
was reversed. Id. at 1226.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1230.
135. Seamnons, 864F. Supp. atl118;84F.3dat1233.
136. The district court concluded that in order to show that the defendants' acted "on the
basis of sex," Seamons must show that the defendants acted with intent. Seamons, 864 F. Supp. at
1117-18. The court adopted the intent standard based on precedent derived from Title VI cases,
rather than adopting the Title VII standard. Id. at 1118.
137. The higher standard of institutional liability, however, does not completely explain the
scarcity of reported cases of athletes alleging harassment. In Gebser v. Lagos Independent School
District, the Court held that a student does not have an implied right of action for damages against a
school district for sexual harassment when the school district does not have actual notice of the
harassment. Gebser, 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). Before Gebser, lower courts were in conflict over
what standard to apply. Even though some lower courts followed a more liberal standard of
institutional liability, there were still relatively few harassment filings by athletes. See supra text
accompanying notes 38-39.
138. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d) (2001).
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such a person .... ,139 Title VII holds the employer responsible for acts of
its agents within the scope of the agent's duty and in some circumstances for
acts outside the scope of the agent's employment. 14  Harassment, for
example, is generally considered outside the scope of an agent/employee's
duty. 141 The employer is nevertheless liable if it appears that the agent acted
with the employer's authority or if the existence of the agency relationship
aids the agent in accomplishing his or her nefarious purpose. 142 In
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, Kimberley Ellerth alleged that her
supervisor, Ted Slowik, had subjected her to constant sexual harassment. 143
Ellerth argued that her employer, Burlington Industries, was responsible for
the harassment although Ellerth never reported the harassment. 144 The Court
concluded that an employer could be vicariously liable for the actions of a
supervisor who is aided in his harassment by the existence of the agency
relationship. 145
Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination by educational institutions,
on the other hand, does not contain specific agency language. Title IX
defines "educational institution" as "any public or private preschool,
elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational,
professional, or higher education." 146 Title IX is silent as to vicarious
liability.
Because the definition of an educational institution under Title IX does
not have specific agency language, 147 in Gebser v. Lagos Independent
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
140. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802-803 (1998) (agreeing that the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 219(2) provides a starting point for employee liability under
Title VII and that a supervisor's position may create a greater risk of employee liability because of
the employer's greater ability in part to control the actions of its supervisors); see, e.g., Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 219(2)
emt. e (1958)) (listing the situations in which an employer may be liable for the torts of an employee
acting solely for his or her own purposes).
141. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-94; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 757.
142. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 758.
143. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 758.
144. Id. at 748-49.
145. Id. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (holding that an employer is vicariously
liable for an actionable hostile environment claim created by a supervisor, unless employer can show
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the harassment and
employee unreasonable failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective opportunities the
employer provided).
146. 20U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1994).
147. Title IX, which is modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is a funding
statute. The primary remedy for a Title IX violation is the possible withholding of federal funding.
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994). It was originally thought that Title IX did not provide for either a private
cause of action for a Title IX violation and further that no damages were available to remedy such a
violation. This view changed, however, based on two Supreme Court cases: Cannon v. Univ of
Chicago, 411 U.S. 677, 717 (1979), which held that Title IX recognizes an implied private right of
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School District148 and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,149 the
Court rejected vicarious liability for educational institutions. In Gebser, the
Court held that an educational institution could not be held vicariously liable
for sexual harassment committed by one of its employees, unless a plaintiff
can prove the institution had actual notice and deliberately refused to take
steps to prevent or correct the harassment.
150
Meritor's rationale for concluding that agency principles guide the
liability inquiry under Title VII rests on an aspect of that statute
not found in Title IX: Title VII, in which the prohibition against
employment discrimination runs against "an employer," (citation
omitted), explicitly defines "employer" to include "any agent,"
(citation omitted). Title IX contains no comparable reference to an
educational institution's "agents," and so does not expressly call
for application of agency principles.1
5 1
Likewise, in Davis, a student-on-student sexual harassment case, the
Court confirmed that the institution is liable for damages only if it has actual
knowledge of the harassment and is deliberately indifferent in responding to
the harassment. 1
52
"Actual notice" in this context occurs when "an official who at a
minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute
corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of
discrimination in the recipient's programs and fails adequately to
respond."' 53 The knowledge of the harasser himself (i.e., the coach in the
case of coach/athlete sexual harassment) is not pertinent to the notice
inquiry.
154
action, and Franklin v. Gwinnet County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 73-76 (1992), which held that a
private plaintiff can collect damages for Title IX violations.
148. 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (holding that a student does not have an implied right of action for
damages against a school district for sexual harassment where the school district does not have
actual notice of harassment).
149. 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding a school district liable for damages in a student-on-
student sexual harassment claim).
150. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-291 (1998). Although Gebser limits the private recovery of
damages to those situations in which the institutions has actual notice of the harassment, this will not
necessarily shield these institutions from all liability. See STATEMENT BY U.S. SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION RICHARD W. RILEY: ON THE IMPACT ON TITLE IX OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S
GEBSER i. LAGO VISTA DECISION (July 1, 1998), at http://www.ed.gov/PressReleases/07-
1998/lago.html (concluding that, while the Gebser decision limits the situations where litigants can
obtain damages in a private Tite IX lawsuit, failure to take steps to prevent sexual harassment
nevertheless violates Title IX and may subject an institution to enforcement actions by the
Department of Education).
151. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283 (citations omitted).
152. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649-650.
153. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91.
154. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 280 for the proposition that where a
school district's liability rests on actual notice principles, the knowledge of the wrongdoer himself is
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The effect of Gebser and Davis was to limit educational institution
liability, thereby setting the bar higher for plaintiffs to successfully hold
institutions liable for damages for sexual harassment.1 55 Plaintiffs who
cannot meet this higher standard of liability are left without a damages
remedy under Title IX and instead must pursue causes of action under
alternate theories, such as liability for state actors under § 1983 or state law
tort causes of action.
156
While the limitations of current Title IX jurisprudence could be
addressed within the current framework, tinkering with Title IX does not
address the deeper questions we could and should be asking about the
gender-based assumptions that underlie our current conception of athletics.
Part IV, which follows, begins a preliminary inquiry into understanding the
legal and social construction of gender in sports. Understanding how law
and society shape gender will have an impact on how Title IX can be used to
subvert the embedded gender-based hierarchies that perpetuate patriarchy in
sport.
IV. MODELS OF ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION
We cannot begin to understand the limitations of harassment law for
addressing the problem of mistreatment and abuse of athletes until we
understand the models of athletic participation that help foster an
environment in which harassment occurs. Currently, the law accepts the
"male model" of athletic competition for both sexes. Operation of the male
model creates harms that are not cognizable under current harassment law.
A. Defining the Athlete
The term "athlete" refers to one who is "trained or skilled in exercises,
games or sports requiring physical strength, agility, or stamina."'157 While
not pertinent to the analysis).
155. For a critique of the Court's rejection of the vicarious liability standard in Title IX
cases, see Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability
Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 758 (1999)
(supporting the application of the strict liability standard, which the Court has applied to employers
in Title VII cases, to Title IX cases).
156. See, e.g., Turner v. McQuarter, 79 F. Supp. 2d 911, 916 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that
university officials were not on notice of sexual harassment under § 1983); Newman v. Obersteller,
915 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Tex. 1996) (affirming a denial of summary judgement for the defendant in a
case involving § 1983); Landreneau v. Fruge, 94-553 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/12/96), 676 So. 2d 701, 704
(La. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the school board not liable because its employee's act of sexual
harassment was beyond the scope of employment under state tort law); see also Deak, supra note 31,
at 185, 189-93 (discussing the standard for whether a defendant is acting under "color of state law"
in a § 1983 suit). Coaches have also been criminally punished for abusing athletes. See, e.g.,
Scadden v. Wyoming, 732 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Wyo. 1987) (involving a high school coach convicted
of second-degree assault for having a sexual relationship with a student).
157. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 72 (10th ed. 1998); see also DAVID
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the dictionary definition of the word "athlete" is apparently gender neutral as
it does not explicitly reference gender (male or female), models of athletic
behavior are based on qualities traditionally associated with men-
combativeness, competitiveness, and aggression. 158 The ideal athlete, then, is
someone (male or female) who exhibits those characteristics. 159
Historically, the public considered these athletic traits as exclusively
masculine. The rise of organized sport during the nineteenth century was a
way to affirm the superiority of American male masculinity.16 1 Sport taught
a particular view of masculinity-the opposite of what is feminine or
womanly.162 The term "athlete," then, historically referred exclusively to
men.
B. The Female Athlete
The advent of women into the realm of sports in the late nineteenth
century challenged social views of masculine versus feminine behavior.
163
PARGMAN, UNDERSTANDING SPORT BEHAVIOR 110 (1998) (defining the term "athlete" as referring
to "one who trains and practices with an eye towards success in competition involving large muscle
activity").
158. See generally MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POWER AT PLAY: SPORTS AND THE PROBLEM OF
MASCULINITY (1992) (exploring the traditional union between aggressive masculinity and
competitive sport).
159. For centuries, the word "sports" and "athletics" were viewed as synonymous with men
and with manly activities and attributes. Sports required strength, speed, power, and a muscular
physique; competition in sports required one to be outgoing and aggressive. These traits were
traditionally considered to be masculine and "manly." See VICrORIA SHERROW, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WOMEN & SPORTS, at ix (1996).
160. Our contemporary views of masculinity, which are associated with aggressiveness and
physical strength, were not always the predominate view. These contemporary views can be traced
to the emergence of a new "passionate manhood" in the end of the nineteenth century. It was during
this time that ambition, combativeness, competitiveness, and aggression became the standard of
"manly" virtues and characteristics associated with "femininity" were considered dangerous and
threatening to men. See generally E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA (1993)
(discussing the persuasiveness of the new masculine virtues of the nineteenth century).
161. See David Whitson, Sport in the Social Construction of Masculinity, in SPORT, MEN,
AND THE GENDER ORDER, supra note 92, at 19, 21 (arguing that since the middle nineteenth century,
sport has played an important part in how masculinity is constructed and how "manliness" (the
particular way of being male) has achieved and maintained its privileged position in Western
societies). The rise in sport coincides with the many other social and economic changes in American
society, social and economic changes that were considered threatening to the traditional ideas of
American masculinity. Id.; see also Todd Crosset, Masculinity, Sexuality and the Development of
Early Modern Sport, in SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER, supra note 92, at 45-53 (arguing
that sport, along with other social institutions of the mid-nineteenth century, affirmed male
superiority, including male sexual superiority).
162. See Whitson, supra note 161, at 19-29 (arguing that sport "ritualizes aggression and
allows it to be linked with competitive achievement and, in turn, with masculinity").
163. As one sociologist describes it, the advent of women in this traditionally male activity
forced society to grapple with such questions as:
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Sport was not considered an appropriate activity for women. 164 Various
justifications were offered for the exclusion of women from sport, including
the assertions that sport was too taxing for a woman's frail body165 or that
sport would lead to the masculinization of women.166 Despite societal
resistance, women nevertheless increasingly participated in a wide range of
sports. 167 But competing and often contradictory views of female athleticism
gave rise to different philosophies about the treatment of women athletes.
Some advocated that to be taken seriously as athletes, women should act
"just like men."' 168 Others, however, counseled that women athletes should
develop their own model of athletic participation "different from men."
169
As between the two views, the "same as men" model predominates in
contemporary women's sports.17
0
C. The Male Model
First, the male model embodied in the "same as men" approach
tolerates and even celebrates coaches who adopt a win-at-all-costs style.
Because male coaches tend to have more experience with this style of
coaching, it favors male coaches over female coaches. 17 The result is that
Would women engaging in a traditionally male activity become more manlike? What
exactly were "manly" and "womanly" qualities, and did they have to be limited to men
and women, respectively? And female athleticism was not essentially masculine, did
this mean that all gender differences were mutable and not ordained by, and
permanently ensconced in, nature?
CAHN, supra note 3, at 3.
164. "In 776 B.C., at the first ancient Greek Olympic Games, not only were women banned
from competition, but any woman caught watching the games could be thrown to her death from the
top of Mount Typaion." SHERROW, supra note 159, at ix.
165. Some advocated that women should play sports despite the charges that it would lead to
the masculinzation of women, some of these advocates, however, sought to protect the reputation
and health of female athletes by devising separate, less physically taxing versions of women's sports.
CAHN, supra note 3, at 3-4.
166. Historian Susan Calm notes that advocates of women's sport developed numerous and
often competing strategies to cope with the "dissonance between masculine sport and feminine
womanhood." Id. Some advocates accepted that the "masculinization" of women was an inevitable
result of women playing sports, but claimed there was a positive value to the "masculinization"
process. It would, for example, contribute to female emancipation. Il
167. See generally id. at 7-30 (describing the rise of female athleticism in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century America).
168. Id. at 4-5.
169. Id.
170. The description of the two models that follow make such an observation obvious. See
infra Parts IV.C, IV.D.
171. See NELSON, supra note 46, at 185 (noting that authoritarian coaching styles are
adopted in women's sports); see also Ellen J. Staurowsky, Women Coaching Male Athletes, in
SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER, supra note 92, at 163-70 (arguing that the under-
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many women athletes are coached by men and the cross-gender interaction
creates an environment susceptible to sexual harassment. 172 Second, coaches
under this male model exert a great deal of power and control over the
athletes they train. Because of the nature of the power imbalance between
male coaches and athletes, the athletes are vulnerable to the introduction of
inappropriate sexual relationships. And, because women are more likely to
be coached by men than men are to be coached by women, women are
disproportionately harmed by this phenomenon. 7 3 Third, because the male
model is based on a particular view of masculinity defined in opposition to
"feminine" characteristics, feminine characteristics of athletes are
denegrated, perpetuating the idea that characteristics associated with women
are undesirable in sport and further contributing to women's
subordination.
174
Because athletic behavior is based upon models of combativeness and
aggression, it is not surprising that certain types of coaching techniques-
techniques that foster and reinforce these aggressive traits-are outside the
current understanding of harassment law. Traditionally, male athletes have
been subjected to aggressive coaching styles that cross the line into abuse.
Coaches like Bobby Knight, for example, are known for an "in your face"
coaching style.175 This model of coaching behavior has found its way into
women's sports as well. Female coaches like Pat Summit also adopt such
aggressive coaching styles. 176 As the Ericson case illustrates, there are
representation of women in coaching linked to an underlying assumption that sports expertise is
linked with male superiority and that male coaches are the embodiment of the masculine athletic
ideal and automatically devalue the achievement of women).
172. See supra notes 83-84 and Parts II.C.2 and Im.C.3.
173. See supra Parts Mi.C.2 and IH.C.3.
174. See supra Part III.C.3.
175. Bobby Knight, the former coach of the Indiana Hoosiers, is renowned for his short
temper, explosive outbursts and general incivility. Reggie Rivers, Knight Just Doesn't Get It,
DENVER POST, Sept. 14, 2000, at B-11 (describing Knight's antics after his firing). It was not
uncommon to see a red-faced coach Knight, nose-to-nose with a player, yelling all manner of
obscenities, or tossing a chair to emphasize his displeasure. Id. One former player, Neil Reed, alleges
that Knight choked him during a 1997 practice. Associated Press, Knight Abuse Tape Surfaces (Apr.
12, 2000), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/sports/dailynews/knight000412.html. Another former
player, Richard Mandeville told CNN that Knight once "came out" of a bathroom, "pants down to
his ankles, and just wiped his ass," showed the players soiled toilet paper, "and said, 'This is how
you guys are playing."' Audio file: Student Athletes Formerly Coached by Bobby Knight, at http'/
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/thenetwork/news/2000/03/14/knight-indianatoilet.htmL. Another former
player claims to have witnessed Knight punching and slapping players. Associated Press, supra.
Other notable Knight incidents include throwing a chair during a 1985 game, kicking a player in
1993, and accidentally head-butting a player in 1994. Alan Schmadtke, A Career on the Brink:
Coach Has Often Courted Success, Controversy, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 15, 2000, at B1; A Dark
Side of Knight: Ex-Hoosiers Speak in CNN/Sports Illustrated Exclusive, at http:lsportsillustrated.
cnn.comlthenetworklnews/2000/03/14/knight_indianaindex.html (Sept. 10, 2000).
176. Pat Summitt is the extremely successful coach of the women's basketball team at the
University of Tennessee. Sumniitt admits that she has often yelled at players to motivate them. "I'm
a yeller, and so I yell. My voice gets so hoarse it sounds like tires crunching over gravel." See PAT
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consequences to adopting this model in women's athletics. 177 Ericson
challenges not only the boundaries of appropriate physical contact between
coaches and players, but also questions the appropriateness of coaching
techniques that rely on denigrating and belittling players. 178 Coach Jesse
Dwire's misogynistic "motivational" speeches to his female athletes
179
implied that to be athletes they must deny their womanhood. He implied that
they could not be both women and athletes. This attitude leads to
marginalization of women athletes.
Critical race scholars describe similar phenomena in the context of race
and gender discrimination. They have developed a theory of
"intersectionality" to describe the harm caused by laws that do not recognize
the multiple identities of plaintiffs who experience discrimination based on
more than one characteristic.180 Kimberle Crenshaw, for example, observes
that while African-American women experience discrimination both because
of their gender and because of their race, anti-discrimination laws treat
characteristics such as race and gender as separate and distinct. 181 She argues
that this single-issue approach leads to further marginalization of those
caught at the intersection of race and gender.182 Similarly, women athletes
are caught at the intersection of their gender and the male model of
athleticism. While race and gender are more fundamental personal
characteristics than athleticism, the analogy is useful to illustrate the harm
that occurs as a result of following the male model.
D. The Female Model
The problems with the male model might suggest that a female model
would be more appropriate. 183 This is certainly the view of the umpire in the
excerpt from A League of Their Own:
Umpire: Perhaps you chastised her too vehemently. Good rule of
thumb. Treat each of these girls as you would treat your mother.'
84
SUMMrrr WITH SALLY JENKINS, RAISE THE ROOF: THE INSPIRING INSIDE STORY OF THE TENNESSEE
LADY VOLS' UNDEFEATED 1997-98 SEASON 2-4 (1998).
177. Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see discussion infra
Part llI.C.3.
178. Ericson, 35 F. Supp. at 327-29.
179. Riede, Former Players, supra note 37.
180. Crenshaw, supra note 13, at 139, 140.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Physical education professors Vivian Acosta and Linda Jean Carpenter, for example,
argue for a "female" model for intercollegiate sports. See Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, A
"Partnership" Model of Sports (1995), at http://www.feminisLorgtresearch/sports8a.html.
184. A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN, supra note 1.
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The umpire's comments favor a separate, uniquely female approach to
women's athletics. But the issue is whether such an approach would be
beneficial or appropriate.
Whether and when women should be treated differently is a proposition
often debated within feminist literature.185 Feminists have approached the
definition of women's equality in a few different ways. 186 "Liberal" or
"equality" feminists stress the similarities between men and women.I17 They
argue for the abolition of gender-based classifications to the extent they are
based upon "distorted, inaccurate, irrational, and arbitrary" distinctions
based on sex. 188 They suggest that the law should focus on breaking down
barriers to women's advancement and that the ultimate goal should be equal
opportunity. 189 Title IX seeks to implement this philosophy. 90
"Cultural" or "difference" feminists argue that ignoring the differences
between men and women harms women. 191 Instead, these feminists focus on
the ways women differ from men and posit that law must acknowledge these
differences. 192 For example, treating women and men equally with respect to
reproduction and child-rearing obligations disadvantages women who for
sociological and biological reasons disproportionately bear the burden of
these responsibilities. 193 But, viewing women as different from men and
deserving of special treatment can result in reliance on stereotypes of women
that eventually operate to women's disadvantage.
194
185. There are many different schools of feminist theory, including "liberal feminism,
cultural feminism, socialist feminism, psychoanalytic feminism, existentialist feminism, radical
feminism," and "postmodem feminism." See Michael A. Messner & Donald F. Sabo, Introduction:
Toward a Critical Feminist Reappraisal of Sport, Men, and the Gender Order, in SPORT, MEN, AND
THE GENDER ORDER, supra note 92, at 3.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON LIFE AND LAW 117
(1987).
189. See LEVrT, supra note 113, at 189-91.
190. Title IX generally follows the equal opportunity model, with one exception. Title IX
specifically excludes contact sports from its general guarantee that women will have an equal
opportunity to compete in all sports. See Mary A. Boutilier & Lucinda F. San Giovanni, Politics,
Public Policy and Title IX: Some Limitations of Liberal Feminism, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND
CULTURE 97-109 (Susan Birrell & Cheryl L. Cole eds., 1994).
191. Crenshaw, supra note 13, at 140.
192. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
193. See LEVrT, supra note 113, at 191 (highlighting the need for recognizing that men and
women have varying needs that justify certain unequal treatment under the law).
194. For example, in EEOC v. Sears, Sears successfully argued that women were not
discriminated against in obtaining commission sales jobs despite their low numbers in these
positions because there was no reason to assume that women and men had similar interest in these
positions. EEOC v. Sears, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Sears argued that the lack of interest on the
part of women reflected a legitimate difference between men and women rather than intentional
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Applying difference theory to athletics suggests that techniques that
work with male athletes may not work for female athletes.'95 Unlike in
men's sports where the male model has always predominated, the male
model is a relative newcomer to women's sports. Traditionally, women
athletes were considered more sensitive and fragile than men, 19 therefore
necessitating a more gentle coaching approach. The legacy of this attitude is
that coaching behavior that is perfectly acceptable in men's sports, such as
yelling, may not be as acceptable in women's sports. 19 7 Indeed, coaches of
women's teams have been disciplined and even terminated for verbal abuse
of their female athletes. 198 In the context of athletics, a less aggressive style
of coaching may reap certain benefits in the quality of the athletes' lives;
however, use of these more genteel coaching styles are often based on
paternalistic concerns that women are unable to withstand a more aggressive
style, and this view of women athletes contributes to their marginalization.
E. A New Model
Of course, the difficult question is what approach should be used to
coach women athletes. The problem can be approached in two ways. First is
the legal approach. One possible reform for Title IX is to expand the
definition of harassment to take gender into account. 199 Vicki Schultz, for
example, argues that the current approach to defining sexual harassment
focuses on whether the harasser sexually desired the victim, but fails to
discrimination by Sears. Id. The Sears case demonstrates how difference theory can be used to mask
unequal treatment by reliance on stereotypes about women's interests. Professor Williams argues,
for example, that the employer's argument in Sears ignored the structural disadvantages that played
into the women's choices-for example, the extent to which women subordinate their career choices
to support husbands for families. Joan Chalmers Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference
Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991
DuKE L.J. 296,303 (1991).
195. Psychologists suggest that competition is a stronger motive for males than for females
and that young female athletes place more emphasis on friendship and fun than do their male peers.
See PARGMAN, supra note 157, at 70 (describing the results of psychological studies of male and
female athletes).
196. See generally MESSNER, supra note 158 (discussing the connection between
masculinity and sports).
197. Bloom, supra note 84 (reporting that aggressive approaches traditionally used with
boys do not always work with girls, who mature differently and have a different emotional
perspective).
198. See Associated Press, OCU Coach Stanley Will Not Return, Apr. 24, 2000, 2000 WL
19884219 (describing the suspension and contract non-renewal of a college-level women's
basketball coach after an investigation into player complaints of verbal abuse); Associated Press,
MSU Women's Hoop Coaches Fired, Nov. 1, 1999, 1999 WL 28134753 (describing the termination
of two coaches for violations of NCAA rules and for mental abuse of players). I am not saying that it
was wrong that they were fired. But they should not have been fired because they were abusive
toward women but because they were abusive.
199. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation Of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1995).
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adequately respond to those situations where the harassment stems from
gender hostility rather than sexual desire.200 Katherine Franke similarly
argues that Title VII focuses on "sex" or biological classifications ("male"
or "female"), rather than the characteristics associated with gender
("masculine" or "feminine"). 20 1 For example, she notes the difficulty
encountered by plaintiffs such as gay men or transgendered individuals who
are harassed because they do not meet the gender role expectation of the
202harasser. The expansion of Title IX protections to include gender is an
imperfect solution for women athletes because of the operation of the male
model of athletic participation, which incorporates a particular view of
masculinity within its definition of athlete. Unlike in the workplace where
the conduct that constitutes harassment is often peripheral to the work at
hand, the non-sexual gendered behavior at issue in some Title IX cases is
considered a necessary and important part of the sport.203
A more comprehensive solution involves changing attitudes toward
sport. This would involve creating a new model of athletic participation-
changing the definition of athlete and reexamining the goals of athletic
competition. But changing the current patterns of behavior in sport presents
an even greater challenge.
1. Redefining the "Athlete"
The reason to create and implement new models of athletic behavior is
not just to protect women, but to protect athletes, male and female. It has
become increasingly apparent that men also suffer under the current
model, 20 particularly men who do not play along with stereotypic notions of
masculinity, men like Brian Seamons.
205
What would such a model look like? It would be non-gendered but also
take into account differences between individual athletes. "Post-modem"
feminists argue that feminist theory must go beyond the "sameness" versus
"difference" debate and take into account the multiple identities and
200. Schultz, supra note 100.
201. Franke, supra note 199.
202. LEvlr, supra note 113, at 113 ("Courts are virtually uniform in rejecting claims of
sexual harassment on the basis of sexual orientation.").
203. See supra Parts III.C.3, IH.C.4.
204. Feminist scholars have begun to explore the negative effects on men of trying to uphold
traditional masculine values. See generally SUSAN FALUDI, STIFED: THE BETRAYAL OF THE
AMERICAN MAN 3-47(1999) (tracing the contemporary problems of the American man to the drive
to fulfill post-World War H promises of male domination); LEvIr, supra note 113, at 105-22
(describing how the operation of masculine norms in society constructs men as tough, stoic, and
impervious to pain, requiring men to suffer certain harms, including exclusion from caring and
nurturing roles).
205. See text accompanying notes 131-136.
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viewpoints of women.2 06  These multiple identities include such
characteristics as race, class and sexual orientation. 207 For example, the
failure of Title IX to acknowledge racial differences among athletes has led
to concerns that the distinct problems of African-American athletes go
unaddressed. °8
2. Redefining the Relationship Between Athletes and Coaches
Changing attitudes about sport should involve changing our attitudes
about coaching. A major task of a coach is as an educator, teaching skills to
players. One argument for keeping the status quo is the assertion that current
coaching techniques that emphasize punishing athletes through reprimands
or shouting are necessary for learning. One form of punishment is where the
athlete is punished by having to do or withstand something unpleasant.
2 0°9
The punishment may be verbal, such as yelling or reprimanding, or physical,210
such as demanding the running of extra laps or extra push-ups. The
second form of punishment is where the athlete is punished by having
something pleasant or positive taken away. 211 For example, the athlete may
be benched after a poor play. But psychologists suggest that "punishment is
usually not a preferred means of changing behavior because it emphasizes
fear."2
12
3. Redefining the Goals
It is unclear, however, whether the aggressive competition model used
206. Williams, supra note 194, at 302.
207. Angela Harris argues that one of the limitations of feminist theory is its tendency to
conceptualize women as a generic whole without considering the unique circumstances of women of
color. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
588-589 (1990).
208. See generally Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Emphasizing Torts in Claims of
Discrimination Against Black Female Athletes, 38 WASHBuRN L.J. 817 (1999) (arguing that an
equality-based legal regime does not provide an adequate remedy for African-American female
athletes); see also Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Black Women, Gender Equity and the Function at the
Junction, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 239, 240-241 (1996) (examining the meaning of gender equity as it
applies to black female athletes); see generally Marilyn V. Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, 6
MARQ. SPORTS L 229 (1996) (analyzing whether African American females are receiving athletic
benefits in equal numbers); see generally Tonya M. Evans, Comment, In the Title IX Race Toward
Gender Equity, The Black Female Athlete is Left to Finish Last: The Lack of Access for the
"Invisible Woman," 42 How. L.J. 105 (1998) (asserting that Title IX benefits white women over
African American women).
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in most athletics is actually necessary for success. 2 13 Even if current
coaching styles do produce "winners," the question is whether winning at
any cost is an appropriate goal, at least at the educational institutions
covered by Title IX. The central mission of the educational institutions
covered by Title IX is learning. Commercialization of athletics, especially at
the college level, drives the win-at-all-costs mentality."' Winning, rather
than learning, has become the sole focus of many institutions because
winning at the college level and increasingly at the high school level means
money for the school in the form of television revenues and income from
sponsors and to coaches in the form of consulting contracts.21 5
A new athletic model would encourage coaches to use alternative
training techniques and to instill in their athletes a different kind of
motivation for achievement. If coaches and athletes are not required to win
at all costs, then the conditions under which athletes play will receive
sufficient scrutiny. No longer could an institution continue to employ an
admittedly abusive coach just because of his winning percentage.
V. CONCLUSION
Title VII jurisprudence is far from a perfect fit for Title IX cases. First,
it defines the conduct that will constitute harassment too narrowly. Second,
it does not adequately take into account the unique nature of the
athlete/coach relationship and how it differs from the typical
supervisor/employee relationship. Third, to the extent courts apply the
"reasonableness" standard from Title VII to Title IX cases, the standard for
what is reasonable in athletics tolerates behavior on the playing field that
would not be tolerated in the workplace. Currently, while Title VII standards
guide many court decisions on Title IX; important differences remain. Under
Title IX, courts have a unique opportunity to construct a more protective
sexual harassment jurisprudence that need not, and should not, be as limited
as it has been under Title VII. For the law to capture the nuances of
harassment that women athletes face, it must first challenge the continued
adherence to the male model of athletic participation.
213. The justification for the aggressive competition model is similar to the justification used
in military school cases for their adversarial training methods. Yet, non-adversarial training methods
have proven successful. For a description of the use of adversarial and non-adversarial training
methods in military school cases, see Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1,
94-105 (1995).
214. See Brian L. Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title IX as the Catalyst for an
Alternative Model of College Sports, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 351, 382-418 (1998) (rejecting the
"commercial" model of college sports in favor of a participation model).
215. See, e.g., John C. Weistart, Can Gender Equity Find a Place in Commercialized
College Sports?, 3 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 211-12 (1996) (listing examples of
expenditures in men's college sports and describing them using Harry Edwards' concept of the
"Athletics Arms Race").

